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Court Recognizes Domestic
Violence Survivor's Fair Housing
Challenge to Eviction
by Danielle Pelfrey Duryea*
Hailed by the ACLU Women's Rights Project as "the
first case ever to hold that the Fair Housing Act prohibits
discrimination against domestic violence victims," Bouley
v. Young-Sabourin1 represents a significant advance for the
housing rights of domestic violence survivors.2 In a March
2005 decision denying cross-motions for summary judg
ment, the United States District Court for the District of
Vermont recognized domestic violence survivor Quinn
Bouley's claim of disparate treatment as a prima facie case
of sex discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. Bouley
settled favorably with her landlord in April before the
case could go to trial.
Background:
Domestic Violence, Women and Housing
United States Department of Justice statistics indicate
that intimate partners inflicted 20% of all non-fatal vio
lence against women in 2001 and about one-third of all
homicides of women in 2000.3 Because about 85% of all
intimate partner violence in the United States is commit
ted against women, the far-reaching effects of domestic
violence have a dramatically disproportionate effect on
women.4 Although non-fatal intimate partner violence
against women is down by about one-half since 1993,5
domestic violence remains a major reason for homeless
ness across the United States.6 More than a third of U.S.
cities report domestic violence as a primary cause of

'Danielle Pelfrey Duryea was a law clerk at NHLP in the summer of
2005. She is a J.D./M.P.P. candidate at Georgetown Uruversity and holds
degrees from Yale Uruversity and the Uruversity of VirgirUa.
'No. Gv.1:03 CV 320,2005 WL 950632 (D. Vt. Mar. 10,2005).
:Press Release, American Civil Liberties Uruon, Federal Law Protects
Battered �omen From Housing Discrimination, Court Rules (April 1,
2005), avarlable at http:/ I www.aclu.org/ WomensRights/ WomensRights.
cfm?ID=l7883&e=173. The decision and ACLU amicus brief are available
at the same location.
ULLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF }US'fiCE STATISTICS, INnMATE PARTNER
VIOLEt-.CE 19 93-20011 (2003),available at http:/ I www.ojp.usdoj.gov /bjs/
pub/pdf/ipvOl.pdf. The comparable figures for men victirrUzed by inti
mate partners were 3% for nonfatal violence and 4% for murders. /d.
'See rd. These statistics are for 2001.
'Id.
'Emily ). Martin and Naonti S. Stem, Domestic Violence and Public and
Subsidized Housing: Addressing tl!e Needs of Battered Tenants T l!rougl! Local
Housing Policy, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 551,552 (2005).
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homelessness? Depending on their region of residence,
between 22% and 57% of homeless women report that
domestic violence was the precipitating cause of their
homelessness.8 Whether they face losing shelter when
they flee intrafamily violence or when they are evicted as
a direct result of the violence, women living in poverty are
at special risk.
Domestic violence survivors face a variety of forms
of housing discrimination in admissions and occupancy,
as well as in evictions.9 Women who have been complain
ing victims in a criminal proceeding may find themselves
"screened out" of housing opportunities when their names
appear in background checks. Mandatory arrest policies
and courts that issue mutual protection orders may even
result in criminal record checks that make victims appear
to be perpetrators. A survivor often may not have a solid
work or credit history or landlord references because the
abuser has prevented her from holding a steady job, main
taining financial independence, or developing interper
sonal relationships with others.
As a condition of tenancy, landlords sometimes
demand that no violence occur in the future, a condition
not imposed on other residents. Where a victim is living
with her abuser but only the abuser's name is listed on
the lease, authorities may assert that they cannot evict the
perpetrator and allow the victim to continue her occu
pancy. A victim may be held financially accountable for
her abuser's damage to a rental property. And anecdotal
evidence from advocates in the field suggests that sex
stereotype-based animus underlies much discrimination
against domestic violence victims in admissions, occu
pancy and evictions.
Landlord Tried to Evict Within Seventy-Two
Hours ofViolent Domestic Incident
Jacqueline Yaung-Sabourin owns one three-unit pri
vate rental property in St. Albans, Vermont, that includes
two rental apartments and a bungalow inhabited by her
daughter-in-law and apartment manager, Windee Young.
Three months after Quinn Bouley and her family rented
one of the apartments, Bouley's husband attacked her at
their home. Daniel Sweda was arrested the night of the inci
dent and eventually pled guilty to several criminal charges
related to the attack, including assault. Bouley applied for
a restraining order against her husband on the night of the
attack, and he never returned to the apartment.

7ld. (citing 2003 survey).
8/d. (citing eleven national and regional studies).

"Telephone Interview with Naonti Stern, Staff Attorney, National Law
Center on Homelessness and Poverty Oune 22, 2005); Lenora M. Lapi
dus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic
Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 3 77,384-85 (2003); Telephone
Interview with Entily Martin, Staff Attorney, ACLU Women's Rights
Project Oune 20,2005).
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Apartment manager Young, on whose judgment
Young-Sabourin relied, however, had already decided
that Bouley "didn't fit the role of a victim of domestic vio
lence." Not only had she not been in shock and was still
able to function following the incident, observed Young,
but she had also expressed anger toward her husband and
showed no interest in reconciling with him. On deposi
tion, Young explained further that she was also dubious of
Bouley's abuse claim because she had seen Bouley with a
male visitor not long after the attack, and because Bouley
had received attention from men in her workplace that the
apartment manager found inappropriate.
The day after the attack, landlord Young-Sabourin
made a list of reasons to evict Bouley that included the
domestic violence incident. She then went to visit Bouley,
engaging her in a conversation about the incident and
about Bouley' religious faith. The conversation apparently
ended with Bouley angrily refusing to discuss religion
with her landlord. Later that day, le s than seventy-two
hours after Bouley's husband criminally attacked her, the
landlord sent a letter giving Bouley thirty days' notice to
leave the apartment. The letter quoted a lease provision
that read:
Tenant will not use or allow said premises or any
part thereof to be used for unlawful purposes, in
any noisy, boisterous, or any other manner offen
sive to any other occupant of the building.
Yaung-Sabourin's letter further cited Bouley's angry
response to her religious inquiries as proof that "the vio
lence that has been happening in your unit would con
tinue."
Survivor Points to Gender Stereotypes
Represented by Vermont Legal Aid, Bouley argued to
the federal court that Young-Sabourin initiated eviction
proceedings against her on the basis of her sex and her
religion in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Initially, Bou
ley brought her sex discrimination claim under a disparate
impact theory. Because women represent the great major
ity of domestic violence victims, the complaint alleged
that discriminating against domestic violence victims on
the basis of their victim status disproportionately affects
women in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Cases such
as Alvera v. The C. B.M. Group did much to establish a dis
parate impact theory for domestic violence victims threat
ened with eviction as a result of their abuser's actions.10
Alvera, a plaintiff whose situation was similar to Bouley's,
argued that the defendant management company's "zero
tolerance" policy against household violence--which
had the effect of displacing both the perpetrator and the

10Alvera v. 11te C.B.M. Group, Inc., Gvil No. 01-857-PA (D. Or. October

2001); see Domestic Abuse Victim Settles Discriminatory Eviction Claim
Favorably, 31 Hous. L. BuLL. 265, 265 (2001).
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victim of domestic violence--amounted to prohibited
sex discrimination because the victims of domestic vio
lence are disproportionately women. This approach has
been sanctioned, too, by the Department of Housing a nd
Urban Development's Fair Housing and Equal Oppor
tunity office, which issued a charge of discrimination
against Alvera's landlord on this basis. The Alvera case
subsequently settled without judicial resolution of the
Fair Housing Act claim's validity.
As discovery in Boulelj v. Young-Sabourin proceeded,
however, Vermont Legal Aid attorney Meris Bergquist,
working with the ACLU Women's Rights Project, real
ized that there was more than disparate impact involved
in the case. The landlord and apartment manager's depo
sitions clearly revealed that they believed that Bouley
did not behave "normal[ly] for a woman who had been
victimized" and that she and her husband were equally
responsible for the incident that led to his arrest and sub
sequent guilty plea. So Bouley's cross-motion for sum
mary judgment, supported by the ACLU's amicus curiae
brief, advanced a novel approach to domestic violence
survivors' sex discrimination claims under the Fair Hous
ing Act: disparate treatment rather than disparate impact.
Under the disparate treatment theory, modeled on
and analogous to the well-developed case law on employ
ment discrimination under Title Vll, housing discrimina
tion against a woman because she fails to conform to sex
or gender stereotypes violates the Fair Housing Act. Just
as an employee cannot be denied a promotion because
she is "too aggressive for a woman," then, a tenant can
not be evicted because she fails to conform to a stereotype
of appropriate feminine behavior for a victim of domestic
violence.11 According to an expert in the field of female
abuse and victimization who submitted a declaration on
behalf of Bouley, Young-Sabourin acted on three gender
stereotypes:

1.

that domestic violence can be provoked and that some
times, as in this case, both parties are responsible;

2.

that victims do not get angry and therefore that Bou
ley's anger both at her husband and at Yaung-Sab
ourin was proof that she had violent potential; and

3.

that men who appear "upright" and "honorable," as
Young-Sabourin perceived Daniel Swedo to be, do not
beat their wives.U

Because Bouley's behavior after the violent incident
was not consistent with the landlord and apartment man
ager's gender-stereotyped expectations of how a domestic
violence victim "should" behave, and because they held
a positive view of her husband, Bouley's motion argued,
they sought to evict her.

"See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
12See Pt.'s Cross Mot. for Summary Judgment at 10 (citing Decl. of Sharon

Lamb, Ed.D.).
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Court Denies Summary judgment and
Allows Fair Housing Claim to Proceed
Denying Bouley and Yaung-Sabourin's cross-motions
for summary judgment, Judge J. Garvan Murtha stated
without qualification that "[t]he plaintiff has demon
strated a prima facie case" of sex discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act.13 Under the McDonnell Douglas14
burden-shifting framework, the timing of the eviction,
combined with reasonable inferences a jury could draw
from the eviction notice, were held to return responsibility
to the landlord to assert a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the decision to evict Bouley. Having asserted
no such reason, Young-Sabourin was not entitled to sum
mary judgment.
The Court's brief discussion did not explicitly address
the disparate treatment and disparate impact arguments.
Although the Second Circuit has played a significant role
in developing the disparate treatment law under Title V II,
and even though that circuit has "pointedly accepted" the
analogical relationship between Title VII and Fair Hous
ing Act interpretation,15 the Court declined to elaborate on
its reasoning, naming as authority for its determination a
single case in which both disparate impact and disparate
treatment were cited in opposition to a police policy treat
ing domestic and non-domestic disputes differently.16 The
ACLU amicus brief had discussed this case at some length,
however, as judicial recognition that "treatment of domes
tic violence victims in a 'stereotypic and predefined place'
within the family constitute[s] sex discrimination."17
More significantly, the fact that the Court applied the
McDonnell Douglas test implies that it had disparate treat
ment, rather than disparate impact, in mind, as the McDon
nell Douglas applies only to disparate treatment claims.
The Court also denied, though it did not discuss, Bou
ley's cross-motion for summary judgment.18

13Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, No. Civ.1:03 CV 320, 2005 WL 950632 at *5
(D. Vt. Mar. 10, 2005).
14McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 7952 (1973).
15ACLU Women's Rights Project, Mem.of Law as Amicus Curiae in Supp.
of Pl.'s Mot. for and Opp'n to Summary Judgment at 11 (quoting Hun
tington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 1096 (2d. Cir.
1988), aff'd 488 U.S. 15 (1988)); see also Pl.'s Cross Mot. for Summary Judg
ment at 7.
'"Smith v. City of Elyria, 857 F. Supp. 1203, 1212-13 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
17ACLU, Mem.of Law as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for and
Opp'n to Summary Judgment at 4 (quoting Elyria, 857 F. Supp. at 1212).
18Presurnably the Court did not accept her argument that, under the Price
Waterhouse analysis of "mixed motives"-i.e., where there may have
been both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the adverse action-the
McDontJell Douglas prima facie case concept did not apply. Price Water
house u. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (finding firm liable where both legitimate
and sex-discriminatory factors motivated its denial of partnership to
a woman). Under this analysis, Bouley argued, she would have been
entitled to summary judgment if the Court accepted: (1) that Bouley
had established that gender was a motivating factor in the attempt to
evict her; and (2) that Young-Sabourin would be unable to prove by a
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Advocates' Best Lessons
The housing issues faced by domestic violence survi
vors have sometimes "fallen between the stools," accord
ing to both Emily Martin of the ACLU and Naomi Stern of
the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty.19
Housing advocates have not always recognized the spe
cial plight of women threatened with homelessness as
a result of intrafamily violence, and the women's rights
community has sometimes misunderstood the nature of
housing legal issues. And there has been little commu
nication or cooperation between housing and domestic
violence advocates. As a result, the law is underdevel
oped. As Martin emphasizes, however, this is a "winnable
fight": once educated about the problem, most law- and
policymakers are sympathetic.

There has been little communication or
cooperation between housing and domestic
violence advocates. As a result,
the law is underdeveloped.

Although both Stern and Martin lament the lack of
detailed discussion in the Court's decision, both are opti
mistic about the future of the disparate treatment theory
of sex discrimination against intrafarnily violence survi
vors. "This [decision] is the clearest law we have yet,"
says Martin, while Stern characterizes sex discrimination
under the Fair Housing Act as a "very powerful" theory
that should be vigorously pursued to fill out the law in
this area. Celebrating the Bouley litigation's partnership
between a national advocacy organization and a zealous
legal services attorney, both Stern and Martin emphasize
the need for local advocates to think of domestic violence
victims' housing issues as potential civil rights claims.
A variety of factors will suggest the best strategy for
each case. Despite the fact that the disparate impact theory
emerged first, Stern suggests that disparate treatment claims
may ultimately prove more acceptable to courts than dis
parate impact claims, given general skepticism regarding
the latter. Although both Stern and Martin emphasize that
large public housing authorities are not necessarily less apt
to discriminate against domestic violence victims on the
basis of gender stereotypes, the disparate treatment theory
may be better suited to cases involving non-institutional
landlords. Martin notes that intent to discriminate and
reliance on gender-stereotyped thinking may be easier
to prove in smaller, less bureaucratic settings, such as in
preponderance of the evidence that she would have taken the same
action for nondiscriminatory reasons alone.
195ee Telephone interviews, supra note 9.
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cases against private and tenant-based Section 8 landlord
as well as small public housing authorities.
The ACLU's Lenora Lapidus has suggested that, in
addition to Fair Housing Act claims, a domestic violence
survivor living in public or other assisted housing may be
able to bring constitutional claims.20 Where seeking police
assistance or obtaining a protective order has led to evic
tion, the survivor may be able to claim that public hous
ing authorities chill and/or punish her exercise of the First
Amendment right to petition the government. If inten
tional sex discrimination can be established, the survivor
may have an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. And, given that claims under the Equal Pro
tection Clause require proof of intentional discrimination,
notes Martin, rather than just disparate impact, a gender
stereotype argument like the one made in Boulet; may be
especially helpful for constitutional claims.
Not only litigation, but also legislative and administra
tive advocacy, are essential tools for taming what Stem calls
housing's "wasteland of sex discrimination." Responding
to litigation and advocacy by a coalition of national civil
rights, domestic violence and housing groups, the 2003
edition of HUD's Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook
included new guidance that encouraged public housing
authorities to prefer domestic violence victims in admis
sions and transfers, and to avoid evicting and terminating
survivors for the actions of their abusers.21
National legislation to protect the housing rights of
abuse survivors in public and other federally assisted
housing is now pending before Congress.22ln addition to
such efforts at the federal level, advocates are working
to enact state legislation to prohibit housing discrimina
tion against all domestic violence victims, not just those
living in assisted housing. Rhode Island and Washington
already have such statutes in force.D Wisconsin prohib
its landlords from determining that someone's tenancy
should be terminated on the basis that it poses a direct
threat to others' safety or property on the basis of the ten
ant's domestic abuse status/4 while Arizona invalidates
any lease provisions waiving or limiting a tenant's right
to call for emergency assistance in a domestic violence
situation.25 In spring 2005, Colorado passed legislation
that provides a variety of new protections for domestic
violence survivors (see box for further detail).26 In New

20See Lapidus, supra note 9, at 383.
215ee HUD, PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 215-21 (2003) (Chapter

19: Domestic Violence).
22See Violence Against Women Act Reautlzorizatiou Includes Sigrziftcant New
Housing Provisions in this issue of the Housing l.Jzw Bulletin.
23R.l. GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-2.4 (2005); W AS�I. REv. C oD E§§ 58.18.580, 59.18.352

(2005).
"Wis. Stat.§ 106.50(5m)(d) (2004).
25A.R.S. § 33-1315 (2004).

Mexico, intimate partner violence is recognized as a
defense in eviction actions as well.27
Conclusion
"[W]hether or not someone subject to domestic vio
lence is considered to be a 'victim' is intimately connected
to . . . 'good girl/bad girl' stereotypes."28 The decision in
BouleJj represents a new judicial recognition that such ste
reotypes can result in violations of core fair housing rights.
To develop the sex discrimination law in housing to match
its power in the area of employment, local advocates must
look to the civil rights dimensions of their work with
domestic violence survivors facing housing crises. •

27N.M. Stat. § 47-8-33(1) (2004).
"'Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Viole11ce in Black a11d Wlrite: Racialized Ge11der
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 CoLUM. ]. GENDER & L. 1, 22 (1998) (quoted
m ACLU, Mem.of Law as Amicus Curine in Supp. of Pl. 's Mot. for and
Opp'n to Summary Judgment at 5).

New Colorado Law
Protects Housing Rights of
Domestic Violence Survivors
Colorado has previously recognized domestic
victimization as an eviction defense but a new law
2005 Colo. HB 1169 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT
§§ 13-40-104, 13-40-107.5(5), 38-12-402), offers affir
mative protections to survivors of domestic violence
and abuse. Legislation signed by Colorado governor
Bill Owens on April 27 now provides that a domes
tic violence victim, as documented by police report
or protective order, cannot be held liable for unlaw
ful detention of real property as a result of abuse. It
further establishes that abusive behavior cannot be
considered a substantial violation of a lease by the
victim of that abuse, and preserves the landlord's
right to evict the abuser. Finally, the new law permits
a victim to break his or her lease on written notice to
the landlord.
The new law went into effect on July 1.

26CoLO. HB. 1169 (2005).
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